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DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING AN ENHANCED CLINICAL PROGRAM 
IN THE AGE OF DISRUPTION. 
Part Two: Clinical Activities1 
 
Professor Bryan Horrigan2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Part One of this article addressed key institutional challenges in designing and 
implementing an enhanced clinical program, informed by a law dean’s perspective on 
the various institutional and individual interests involved. Part Two of this article 
engages with some of the key controversies and disruptions with which an enhanced 
clinical program needs to engage in the 21st century, one way or another. The 
underlying theme in this concluding part of the article is the repositioning of legal 
clinical programs and legal clinicians within their broader and fluid surrounding 
environments.    
                                                            
1 For Part One: see Horrigan, B. ‘Designing and Implementing an Enhanced Clinical Program in the 
Age of Disruption. Part One: The Environment for Clinic.’ International Journal of Clinical Legal 
Education 26.2 (2019): 75-104. 
2 Bryan Horrigan BA, LLB (Hons) (Qld), DPhil (Oxon); is the Dean of the Faculty of Law at Monash 
University, Melbourne, Australia. I am grateful to Emeritus Professor Adrian Evans for comments, 
Jarryd Shaw for research assistance, and the editors and anonymous peer reviewers for comments, 
and assistance with the diagram. All responsibility is mine. 
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TESTING THE OUTER LIMITS AND PURPOSES OF LEGAL CLINICS 
One key disruption for legal clinical programs concerns challenges from 
reconceptualising them in the context of the changing landscape around them. Many 
clinics in many law schools in many countries adhere to a model that is predicated 
upon providing free legal advice and assistance to the most vulnerable, marginalised, 
and disadvantaged people in society. In the first section of this part of the article, I 
accept as a ‘given’ that this model will continue to have a central role in CLE programs. 
However, I question whether the context for the evolution of that model to meet that 
societal need conclusively determines the only or best model for CLE programs from 
here onwards. Moreover, even where that traditional model dominates, it relies upon 
premises and assumptions whose own contingencies are worth re-examination.  
Is it inherent and integral to the notion of a legal clinic that it operates outside the 
private sector and serves only a social justice constituency and only for free? 
Increasingly, the 2st century answer to that question is likely to be ‘no’, or at least ‘not 
always’. 
That answer is controversial and arouses strong views on all sides of the fundamental 
questions addressed and amongst the various stake-holding interests implicated. A 
few elements of that answer therefore warrant further and discrete unpacking, as 
follows. 
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First, the areas of socio-economic need encompassed by access to justice are neither 
confined neatly to non-commercial areas of law (e.g. residential tenancy is a 
commercial matter, as is consumer mistreatment by banks) nor experienced only by 
those who are poor, vulnerable, or disadvantaged individuals. For example, small 
businesses and franchises (which are often family-run businesses) are also suitable 
subjects of socio-economic justice, and can be just as exploited as other constituencies 
needing access to justice. Even relatively well-resourced NGOs and multi-stakeholder 
coalitions need support to achieve better access to justice outcomes by holding 
multinational corporations and governments to account for human rights abuses 
through stakeholder lobbying, shareholder activism, and third-party interventions 
(where permitted) in commercial arbitration.  
Secondly, many areas of traditional clinical focus can now be characterised 
simultaneously in more than one way, cutting across boundaries between sectors, 
departments of law, and areas of legal practice. For example, human rights are no 
longer a matter primarily for international and public law and of concern mainly to 
governments and civil society groups, in an era of transnational ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law 
concerning the responsibilities of multinational corporations and other business 
enterprises (including law firms and law schools, for this purpose) in protecting and 
enhancing people’s human rights. Similarly, victims of human rights abuses are not 
the only worthy stakeholders in need of clinic-amenable assistance and advice when 
engaging with companies about their approach to corporate social responsibility 
Reviewed Article 
207 
 
(CSR), in an era when everyone from human rights advocacy groups to institutional 
investors wants companies to engage better with environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) considerations in business and finance.3 
Thirdly, those who argue that a clinic must always be free and reserved for those who 
cannot afford a lawyer and who do not otherwise qualify for publicly funded legal aid 
must go on to confront other conditions in maintaining that claim. Governmental 
policy decisions to reduce areas of publicly funded legal aid cannot be the sole arbiter 
of who is worthy of clinical support. Even people of moderate income find it 
extraordinarily costly when left with no real choice other than to engage with the legal 
system to try to achieve some kind of justice, often with their families and livelihoods 
at risk. This reality in no way diminishes the equal need for well-resourced clinics 
focused upon poverty-related law; it simply extends the definition of unmet, 
contemporary legal need. 
Nor is the funding of a clinic an irrelevant consideration, because all clinics need 
resourcing of one kind or another, and their resourcing is hard enough in an era of 
reduced university and public funding without setting up distinctions based on direct 
and indirect sources of funding. Just as other aspects of a law school’s income-
generation and other funding can cross-subsidise a clinical program, so too some parts 
of a clinical program potentially might cross-subsidise others. For example, in a 
                                                            
3 For more on this topic by the author, see: ‘Boards Brace for a Perfect Storm’, The Australian, (25 April 
2019), pp.30; and Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century, (2010) Edward Elgar, UK. 
Reviewed Article 
208 
 
landmark and future-looking assessment of changes in the legal profession, the Law 
Institute of Victoria’s then President (Katie Miller) authored a report that included the 
following recommendation:4 
If you manage or are on the board of a CLC, discuss and consider with 
your board opportunities for using paid services to cross-subsidise 
your regular services. Consult widely (including with current funders); 
discuss concerns; and, if you decide to proceed, design a service that 
manages those concerns.  
Fourthly, law firms and other organisations can be suitable partners for clinics of one 
kind or another. What makes clinical partnership with some arms of the legal 
profession (e.g. courts/tribunals, governmental departments and agencies, CLCs, and 
NGOs, for example) inherently more worthy than other arms of the legal profession 
(e.g. commercial law firms, commercial bars, and in-house corporate legal 
departments, for example), at least in clinical and ‘access to justice’ terms? Any 
difference is not readily explainable simply on the grounds of the ‘public-private’ 
divide, area of legal work, or source of funding support. 
Partnering family law firms in clinics to achieve social justice for families can be less 
controversial in some clinical quarters than developing clinics with commercial law 
firms, but many commercial law firms do pro bono work too. So, it is not self-evident 
                                                            
4 Miller, K. Disruption, Innovation and Change: The Future of the Legal Profession (Report, December 2015) 
20. 
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that having a clinic for pro bono clients of a law firm is any less worthy a contribution 
to access to justice than clinics with non-commercial law firms, even if the pro bono 
work assists the commercial law firm in tangential ways, such as helping its lawyers 
meet professionally mandated hours of pro bono service to maintain professional 
accreditation or even helping a law firm to meet pro bono targets that qualify it to be 
on panels for governmental legal services work. 
Finally, to the extent that clinics provide benefits for students as well as clients, giving 
the former exposure to the full range of legal services work and organisational 
contexts is a legitimate objective of CLE. It also informs and tests their aptitude for 
commercial or non-commercial legal careers, if they head towards careers in the legal 
profession. The client-focused orientations and skills acquired in clinics are 
transferable to graduate positions even in commercial law firms, regardless of the 
context in which they were acquired.5 
So, students who work in family law assistance clinics, human rights clinics, and 
tenancy dispute clinics, for example, develop interpersonal, team-based, 
administrative, and other skills that are equally valuable to early careers in 
commercial law firms. Conversely, even if a student is destined for legal or non-legal 
careers in community activism, NGOs, and public advocacy, experience from the 
inside of a commercial law firm (and acting for multinational corporations, financial 
                                                            
5 The author acknowledges instructive discussions on this point with the Monash University Faculty 
of Law’s External Professional Advisory Committee. 
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institutions, and governmental regulators) can be invaluable when representing 
clients or organisations on the other side of the fence. 
 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, DIGITAL LITERACY, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE (AI), AND CLE 
A second major challenge to conventional CLE stems from disruptive technologies. 
University legal education generally and CLE in particular are as susceptible to 
disruption as other parts of the tertiary education and legal services industries. Few 
law schools today can remain immune from considering legal technological advances 
in terms of areas of taught law in the curriculum (eg innovation law and privacy, smart 
contracts, blockchain etc), modes of teaching delivery (eg online resources 
supplementing ‘flipped’ classrooms), co-curricular student experiences (eg student 
involvement in legal technology hackathons), and emerging career possibilities for 
students (eg legal technologists, AI-analysts etc). CLE is not immune from that 
disruptive influence, in terms of the subject matter of clinics (eg clinics about start-
ups), the tools and analytics available to service clinical clients (e.g. online legal 
assistance and AI-assisted research on client-related matters), the modes by which 
clinical students might interact with a range of participants (e.g. transnational clinics 
involving two clinical groups from two law schools in online collaboration), and 
familiarity with technological resources used by organisations partnering with law 
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schools in delivering clinics (e.g. legal research and documentary analysis 
technologies). 
The classic clinical model is under pressure. It relies heavily upon point-in-time 
physical visits by clients to meet an available community lawyer in a face-to-face 
meeting in a law school-supported clinic or other CLC to identify what (if any) legal 
problem they face and what (if any) free expert legal assistance might be provided for 
them there or on referral elsewhere. Digital and technological disruption of that model 
is already happening, and many law schools and their clinicians and students are 
adapting accordingly.6 Virtual clinics, clinical apps and bots, smart online clinical 
‘triage’ assessments, client and CLC match-making systems, and other technological 
innovations are already here, with more on the horizon. 
Changes in all legal workplaces (including courts and law schools) are being 
influenced by a key number of overlapping drivers in the fourth industrial era (i.e. 
from industrialisation and electrification to digitalisation and interconnectivity [i.e/ 
‘the Internet of things’]). The volume and impact of change is compounded 
exponentially where AI, other legal technology, globalisation, and other disruptors all 
converge, as illustrated in the following diagram: 
                                                            
6 Eg A. Thanaraj and M. Sales, ‘Lawyering in a Digital Age: A Practice Report Introducing the Virtual 
Law Clinic at Cumbria’ (2015) 22 International Journal of Clinical Legal Education [ci]. 
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Judges and other lawyers in practice have already coped in recent decades with 
transitions from physical evidence to DNA-tested evidence, physical courtroom 
appearance to video-linked courtroom proceedings, fax to email, print-based research 
to online and even computer-assisted research, and manual dictation to digital voice 
recognition. It is not too great a distance for them to adapt to ongoing transitions from 
individualised personal profiling to mass facial recognition technology, delayed print-
based court transcripts to instantaneous computer-assisted transcription, hand-
written judges’ notebooks to e-handbooks and other digital courtroom tools and 
software, wholly judge-directed physical case management to online case 
management, physical jury evidence to jury technology-enabled evidence, and paper-
based courtrooms to paperless courtrooms and virtual courts. 
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To be sure, those innovations might not test fully the moral, empathic, creative, or 
adjudicative capacities that some (perhaps many) doubt that AI can reach, at least 
anytime soon.7 However, there are dangers in anthropomorphising AI and assuming 
that such human qualities completely define lawyerly professionalism.8 On this 
crucial point, two much-cited legal futurologists sound a sobering warning for 
academics, judges, and other legal practitioners alike; on a prudential view, this means 
that the jury is still out on the extent to which AI will replace the ‘decomposed’ 
segments of what academics, judges, and other lawyers actually do:9 
The main themes of our book, The Future of the Professions, can be put 
simply: machines are becoming increasingly capable and so are taking 
on more and more tasks. … It is indeed hard to imagine a machine 
thinking with the clarity of a judge, empathising in the manner of a 
psychoanalyst, extracting a molar with the dexterity of a dental 
surgeon, or taking a view on the ethics of a tax-avoidance scheme. 
… But there is a danger of being excessively human-centric. In 
contemplating the potential of future machines to outperform 
professionals, what really matters is not how the systems operate but 
whether, in terms of the outcome, the end product is superior. In other 
                                                            
7 Susskind, R. & Susskind, D. ‘Robots v Experts: Are Any Human Professions Safe from 
Automation?’, The Guardian (online), (uploaded 28 March 2017). 
8 Ibid, (2017). 
9 Ibid, (2017). 
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words, whether or not machines will replace human professionals is not 
down to the capacity of systems to perform tasks as people do. It is 
whether systems can out-perform human beings. And in many fields, 
they already can.   
In other fora, the Susskinds reinforce the point that expert lawyers (including judges 
and academics) cannot be too complacent about how AI and technology might affect, 
change, or rival at least some of what they currently do.10 While accepting that judicial 
handling of “complex issues of principle, policy, and morality is well beyond the 
capabilities of current and foreseeable computer systems”, Richard Susskind argues 
that there is “no compelling argument against analysing and dividing judicial work 
into separate parts and, where appropriate, finding alternative and more efficient 
ways of undertaking some of these tasks”.11 
In “decomposing” judicial work in much the same way as he decomposes modern law 
firm practice, he recommends greater use by judges of standardisation tools, 
document assembly technology, computerised research, e-filing and e-submissions, 
computer-assisted transcription and real-time judicial annotation, document display 
systems, electronic and visual evidence presentation, online dispute resolution, and 
“virtual” courts.12 The correlative disruption of traditional clinical models and the 
                                                            
10 Approaches to numerically-based ethics assessment regimes for lawyers are already being 
canvassed; see, for example: Evans, A. Assessing Lawyers’ Ethics, (2011). Cambridge University Press  
11 Susskind, R. ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyers: A Virtual Judiciary – Extract’, The Guardian online, (uploaded 
29 January 2013). 
12 Ibid, (2013).  
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decomposition of clinical work into its various components, with a re-imagined 
alignment between clinics, enabling technology, and access to justice are no longer 
distant points on the horizon.  
The future of AI, technology, and law is only one aspect of the future of the legal 
profession explored in recent reports by legal industry peak bodies and publishers.13 
The relationship between AI and robotics, law, and workplaces is now a subject of 
study by the International Bar Association (IBA).14 The Australian Human Rights 
Commission is also focused upon the human rights implications of AI and other new 
technologies.15 
Regulating AI forms another strand of the classic ‘is-ought’ dilemma: just because we 
can do something does not automatically mean that we should do it. Hence, we need 
adequate socio-ethical, legal, and regulatory frameworks for AI and technology. Many 
early attempts at developing frames of reference for this work focus upon developing 
broad principles of practice16 and other fundamental frames of reference.17 
                                                            
13 Disruption, Innovation and Change: The Future of the Legal Profession, Law Institute of Victoria, (2015); 
FLIP: The Future of Law and Innovation in the Profession, Law Society of New South Wales, (2017); and 
LexisNexis, Lawyers. "Robots." Conversations around the Future of the Legal Industry 3 (2017). 
14 IBA Global Employment Institute Artificial Intelligence and Robotics and Their Impact on the Workplace, 
(2017). 
15 Human Rights and Technology Issues Paper, (2018), AHRC.  
16 Boden, M. ‘Principles of Robotics: Regulating Robots in the Real World’ (2017) 29 Connection Science 
124; and Statement on Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems, European Group on 
Ethics in Science and New Technologies, European Commission, (2018).  
17 Leenes, R. et al., ‘Regulatory Challenges of Robotics: Some Guidelines for Addressing Legal and 
Ethical Issues’ (2017) 9 Law, Innovation and Technology 1. 
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Much of the literature is concerned with the ‘nightmare’ of the world that AI might 
unleash in terms of human liability and irrelevance, as distinct from the ‘noble dream’ 
of its potential and opportunities for human benefit.18 Groups of multi-disciplinary 
scholars are combining to explore accountability in the design and use of AI in legal 
and regulatory contexts involving compliance and responsibility,19 with particular 
reference to regulating data-creation and data flows that pass through multiple hands 
in numerous application contexts.20  
In the legal world, the growing literature makes sobering reading for law-makers, 
regulators, courts, legal practitioners, and legal academics. Some themes are as 
follows. All law is simply data, at least in terms of AI analytics. All such data can be 
analysed – everything from the words in judgments, legislation, and contracts to 
commentaries, texts, and social media mentions. Beyond law itself, human beings 
regularly create or consent to the creation of data about themselves that is captured, 
replicated, and analysed digitally, often being generated initially in commercial 
dealings. 
                                                            
18 Buranyi, S. ‘Rise of the Racist Robots – How AI is Learning All Our Worst Impulses’; The Guardian 
(online), (uploaded 8 August 2017); Sodhani, S. ‘A Summary of Concrete Problems in AI Safety’, 
Future of Life Institute, (uploaded 26 June 2018); ‘Franken-Algorithms: The Deadly Consequences of 
Unpredictable Code’, The Guardian online, (uploaded 1 September 2018). The ‘nightmare’ and ‘noble’ 
dream’ contrast uses HLA Hart’s famous description of two competing visions about the nature of 
law and adjudication. 
19 Eyers, D. et al., ‘Towards Accountable Systems’. (2018). Report from Dagstuhl Seminar 18181. 
20 Pasquier, T. et al., ‘Data Provenance to Audit Compliance with Privacy Policy in the Internet of 
Things’ (2018) 22 Pers Ubiquit Comput 333. 
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In analysing all such data, non-human intelligence can potentially reach levels, 
identify patterns, run simulations, model alternative scenarios, and do a vast range of 
other things faster, longer, more accurately, more completely, more connectively, and 
more currently than individual human intelligence can. When the use of non-human 
intelligence is added to endless data flows and passages through various systems in 
their application, the usual rules of privacy and other rights, strict and vicarious 
liability, causation and remoteness of damage, ownership of responsibility, and 
broader implications for access to justice for all are tested at or beyond their limits. 
At that point, for example, the usual and borderless means of creating informed 
consent for legal purposes – ie clicking on ‘I agree’ to conditions that are largely 
unread as a means to access the next clickable webpage item – are also exposed as 
being inadequate, as are our conventional socio-ethical, legal, and regulatory frames 
of reference in dealing with them. Sooner or later, all courts and lawyers will have to 
deal with these implications as they arise in matters before them, whatever else AI 
might do in changing the systems and processes by which courts and lawyers conduct 
legal business. The issues sketched briefly above are new frontiers and battlegrounds 
for access to justice.  
What does all of this mean for CLE in law schools, CLCs, and associated clinical 
partners? First, digital disruption of CLE is already here. At the 2018 Global Legal 
Hackathon, for example, a team from Monash University that included law students 
with clinical experience developed a winning proposal of how technology might be 
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used to address a legal need, centred upon online communication and analytical tools 
to overcome the problem of too many worthy CLC clients, too few available lawyers, 
and unduly onerous transaction costs of a ‘triage’ model based upon solely upon in-
person appointments between lawyers and clients up front. The team – named 
ANIKALegal – ultimately came second in the world in their category.21 
Secondly, both law firm involvement in clinics and the range of problems for clients 
of clinics are apt to expose students to an emerging need for digital literacy in clinical 
work. Some examples of new areas of societal need in delivering access to justice with 
which clinical supervisors and students increasingly must become familiar include: (i) 
digital fraud and theft of personal identities; (ii) online dispute resolution; (iii) 
problems emerging from smart contracts; (iv) victims of robo-trading and market-
affecting algorithms; (v) victims of computer-generated letters from official agencies 
to householders; (vi) discriminatory use of facial recognition technology; (vii) 
familiarity with jury technology in criminal trials; (viii) unpacking inherent human 
biases in sentencing and other algorithms that result in miscarriages of justice; (ix) AI-
assisted analysis of successful legal and constitutional arguments across jurisdictions 
in death penalty cases; and (xi) web-based engagement with royal commissions and 
public inquiries seeking information and case studies from victims. Indeed, at least 
                                                            
21 ANIKALegal later won an industry start-up award and a governmental financial grant. A second 
Monash-affiliated team from the 2019 Global Legal Hackathon (CYNAPSE) also reached the global 
final of the competition in New York. The imperative to use technology in designing and delivering a 
solution to a legal problem creates opportunities to address social injustices at scale.    
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some staff and students will need to become involved clinically in public advocacy 
and research-based submissions about law reform that protects individual privacy 
and other human rights in the digital age. 
Thirdly, the nature and delivery of clinics has potential for evolution in the digital age. 
Virtual clinics already offer an established example of clinics using technology. The 
Monash Law Moot Court, for example, is a multi-million-dollar, technologically 
enabled, and multi-functional facility that we use for clinical purposes too, with 
potential to bring together academics, clinicians, students, and key experts and 
stakeholders for dialogue and collaboration in real time, regardless of their location in 
the world. Given what CLE offers to our understanding of ethics and professionalism 
in lawyering, digital literacy for lawyers also touches upon broader questions of how 
lawyers do and should conduct lawyering through technology, with opportunities to 
expose clinicians and students to such questions and experiences too.22 
Finally, suitable ethical and legal frameworks are yet to be developed for dealing 
systematically and globally with the issues of fairness and justice implicated in 
advances in legal technology and AI-assisted analysis. These fundamental questions 
are suitable areas of focus in a clinical context about the future of access to justice, 
particularly to ensure that its ideals are secured and not compromised by advances in 
systems and processes through technology. Indeed, given the capacity for AI-assisted 
                                                            
22 See, for example, Thanaraj, A. & Sales, M. ‘Lawyering in a Digital Age: A Practice Report 
Introducing the Virtual Law Clinic at Cumbria’ (2015) 22 International Journal of Clinical Legal Education 
[ci]. 
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analysis to replicate in-built human biases and errors at mass scale (e.g. discriminatory 
racial profiling in criminal investigations and sentencing), if not identified and 
corrected at an appropriate stage in the decision-making chain, new issues of access 
to justice are also generated by the digital age.  
Toby Walsh’s 2062: The World that AI Made quotes a 2017 AI conference comment that 
is a good touchstone as we look ahead to what AI will means for all arms of the legal 
profession: ‘Anyone making confident predictions about anything having to do with 
the future of Artificial Intelligence is either kidding you or kidding themselves’.23 
Despite that sobering warning against AI predictions, we know enough now to agree 
on the following high-level propositions with some degree of confidence: 
1. Digital enabling and disruption is real and will become the new normal in time, 
with all arms of the legal profession being fundamentally challenged and changed 
by it; 
2. The challenges of AI require appropriate socio-ethical, legal, and regulatory 
frameworks;24 
                                                            
23McAfee, A. quoted in Walsh, T. 2062: The World that AI Made (2018). La Trobe University Press, 
pp.34. 
24 See, for example, Tasioulas, J. ‘First Steps Towards an Ethics of Robots and Artificial Intelligence’, 
(Paper, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3172840 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3172840. 
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3. In developing those frameworks, we need technologists and AI-specialists to know 
a little bit more about law and ethics, and we need lawyers (including judges) and 
ethicists to know a little bit more about technology and AI; 
4. All legal workplaces need to equip themselves and their staff with digital, 
technological, and AI literacy as part of their organisational DNA, and so all 
organisational leaders across all arms of the profession have an individual and 
collective stake in cultivating this new form of literacy as a core workplace skill; 
5. Given that much legal work can now be automated or computerised, what law 
graduates need to be work-ready is different from what sufficed in the recent past; 
6. Given that computer algorithms can replicate erroneous human assumptions and 
biases at scale, most lawyers will need to know enough about AI to assess and 
translate its inputs and outputs in using AI-assisted analytics, and some lawyers 
and service provides to lawyers (eg legal technologists) will need to know coding 
as a core skill; and   
7. Access to justice and its instruments – from courts, barristers’ chambers, and law 
firms, to publicly funded legal aid, CLCs, and others in the social services sector - 
are not immune from being challenged and disrupted, on one hand, and either 
enabled or harmed, on the other, by AI, technology, and the digital revolution. 
In short, everyone in the CLE business will eventually need some degree of digital 
and/or AI literacy too. This is because students will be familiar with it, graduates will 
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work in organisations where they need it, clinical partnering organisations will use it 
in client-related work to which clinical students are exposed, the needs of access to 
justice for clients will demand it, and advocacy in service to contemporary democracy 
will be left behind without it.    
 
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE ‘ACCESS TO JUSTICE’ COMMUNITY IN THE NEW 
DEMOCRATIC PROJECT 
The disruptions for CLE programs and providers from the forces of globalisation and 
digitalisation have a flip side. The promise of borderless mass connectivity also creates 
new opportunities for partnering and networking for law schools as one arm of their 
local and global legal professions, in pursuit of the realisation of access to justice under 
the rule of law. The next section of this part of the article repositions CLE programs in 
law schools within a broader and transnational democratic project. In that sense, 
disruptive challenges for CLE programs and clinicians ae driven by the combined 
forces of digitalisation, globalisation, and democratisation.  
What are the roles of CLE-supportive law schools and CLCs as actors in evolving 
accounts of democracy in an age of globalised and digitalised interconnectivity? On a 
broader level, law schools and their members join with other governmental and non-
governmental parties as part of a network of oversight and accountability for the use 
and abuse of political and legal power in the continuously evolving democratic 
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system. As we move from focusing solely upon the formal institutions of democratic 
government (such as free elections and law-making by majority vote in legislatures) 
and curbs on their abuse (such as institutional protection of fundamental human 
rights, including through judicial review) as exclusively defining the features (as 
distinct from the formalities) of democracy, there is a new focus upon multi-order and 
multi-constituency accountability for all exercises of public power over others under 
21st century conditions of what is variously called ‘participatory’, ‘deliberative’, and 
‘monitory’ democracy.25 
Under this re-imagining of democracy and its participants and their interactions, the 
organs and actors of government are exposed to enhanced standards of public 
‘contestability’, ‘deliberation’, and ‘justification’ in their official decisions and reasons 
for action, including courts, tribunals, legislative committees, public sector agencies, 
and others with whom CLCs and law school-supported clinics engage on behalf of 
clients and in other forms of advocacy in the pursuit of improved access to justice.26 
Conversely, policy or funding constraints upon the capacity of non-governmental 
actors to exercise oversight on the use and abuse of official power also affects the 
system of checks and balances in this evolving form of democratic engagement. If 
equal access to justice under the rule of law involves action and advocacy to ensure 
                                                            
25 Keane, J. The Life and Death of Democracy (2009). W W Norton and Company, New York; and 
Gutman, A.& Thompson, D. Why Deliberative Democracy? (2004). Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
26 Ibid, (2004).  
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that the non-value-neutral impact of leasing, taxation, and other laws upon poor, 
vulnerable, and disadvantaged people is addressed, for example, then enabling non-
government parties to represent and give a voice to such people in policy-making, 
law-making, and law reform processes is just as valid an object of clinical work, law 
school endeavours, and multi-dimensional contemporary democracy as any other.   
Under such a conception of democracy, governments might still remain at the centre 
of multi-stakeholder networks, standard-setting initiatives, and essential law-making 
and policy-making, but with other participants meaningfully involved systemically as 
well. For example, various arms of the legal profession and other community 
stakeholders can become engaged in the public goods of law-making, the 
administration of justice, access to justice, and the rule of law. The legal academy does 
so by various means, some of which leverage or flow from others, such as: 
a) submissions to public and parliamentary inquiries; 
b) public advocacy and thought leadership on social justice issues; 
c) evidence-based research that informs public policy development and law reform; 
d) contracted research and consultancies for parliamentary and other governmental 
bodies; 
e) expertise-based membership of ministerial and other advisory committees; 
f) appointment as commissioners in regulatory and law reform agencies; 
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g) authoring of amicus curiae briefs, community advocacy programs, and targeted 
(or strategic) public interest litigation, through research centres, student clinics, 
and partner CLCs; 
h) partners with other arms of the legal profession, the institutions of government, 
and the private and community sectors in collaborative research grant projects on 
social justice; 
i) multi-stakeholder enterprises across geographical and sectoral boundaries; 
j) being an independent knowledge-broker, relationship-builder, expertise-sharer, 
and resource-provider with governmental, professional, and community 
organisations tackling social justice problems; and 
k) collaborative endeavours that serve public goods as well as institutional and 
societal needs, such as law school involvement in CLE through CLCs and joint 
enterprises (eg the Monash Law Faculty’s involvement in VicBar’s pro bono 
assistance to self-represented litigants in appeals before the Victorian Court of 
Appeal). 
In these ways and others, law schools are active participants in the systems for 
securing both democracy and access to justice, in the broader senses in which they are 
used in this article. In other words, there are increasingly important connections to be 
drawn between democracy, the rule of law, and access to justice, on one hand, and 
CLCs, CLE, and law schools, on the other. 
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Of course, the institutional capacity (from a decanal or other senior management 
perspective) and personal capacity (from an individual academic’s or clinical group’s 
perspective) to pursue such activities as part of broader democratic engagement must 
again be exercised within the usual strategic and operational parameters of the 
business of running law schools and universities (and they are businesses, on at least 
some levels). As with other option explored in each pat of this article, questions of 
choice and filters for making those choices inevitably arise. The point worth reiterating 
is that while some of those choices might involve trade-offs in time, focus, and effort 
between the various options identified, not all of them do. In most cases, there are 
smart ways to create alignment between institutional needs and individual 
preferences, and the trick lies in identifying and navigating such journeys. 
In doing so, individual academics and clinical groups can leverage most (if not all) of 
the items listed to individual and institutional advantage. In an Anglo-Australian 
tertiary sector regulatory landscape in which research excellence is increasingly 
measured and ranked (although not necessarily funded) in terms of research quality, 
impact, and engagement, research-based advocacy in the form of submissions to 
public inquiries, legislative committees, and law reform agencies by reference to 
evidence-based work and research with ‘access to justice’ constituencies have a place 
in both institutional concerns and individual career development, even if such 
publications do not necessarily count in terms of ‘high quality’ publications in ‘high 
quality’ publication outlets for the purpose of institutional research activity and 
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performance standards. In other words, the question is how they count, not whether 
they count, and those variables change as institutional environments change. At the 
same time, academics must also confront the reality that they cannot necessarily make 
such things count for all purposes institutionally. Institutional priorities and 
individual choices can align but they are not always co-extensive. 
At the same time, nothing presented here from a decanal standpoint about 
institutional leverage and alignment of individual and group choices for strategic 
advantage and smart career navigation in clinical domains should be mistaken as a 
conservative call to conform rather than challenge the institutional status quo. The 
point simply is that the two are not mutually incompatible across the board, and that 
more clinicians and clinical groups could do more to take advantage of the 
opportunities that such leverage and alignment present in institutional contexts.  
In those and other ways, values are implicated in clinical commitment to speaking 
truth to power, facilitating access to justice, remedying socio-economic justice 
(reconceived broadly, as advocated in this article), and fully realising the rule of law. 
Are there also ways in which lawyerly responsibility across all arms of the legal 
profession as participants in systems governed by the rule generates ancillary 
responsibility towards access to justice for the poorest and most vulnerable people in 
society? 
In a recent International Bar Association (IBA) forum, I advanced twin and inter-
related claims that the rule of law is necessarily diminished (or imperfectly realised) 
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in any place where poverty remains and that, as a result, true lawyerly commitment 
to the rule of law means that all lawyers have individual and collective responsibility 
(on some level and in some form) to join the legal war against poverty.27 These two 
claims might be surprising and even confronting for many judges and other lawyers. 
They have direct implications for lawyers across the public, private, and community 
sectors in their commitment to the rule of law through engagement with law schools 
and other partners in combatting poverty by enhancing access to justice, especially at 
the intersection of the societal responsibility of legal organisations, CLEs and CLCs, 
and community legal assistance for those people who are impoverished or otherwise 
in need. 
Access to justice is a fundamental element of the rule of law, on any view of the rule 
of law. In this incarnation, access to justice is a broad concept, extending beyond free 
expert assistance in litigation for anyone who needs it, to embrace access to advocacy 
and other levers of power in influencing laws that adversely impact upon poor people. 
On this view, the rule of law falls short of the ideal at best and is fatally compromised 
at worst whenever and wherever meaningful access to justice is less than optimal. 
The conditions of poverty undermine all essential elements of the rule of law and 
consequently limit the access to justice and engagement of poor people in the legal 
and political systems. The rule of law is therefore diminished and imperfectly realised 
                                                            
27 Horrigan, B. ‘The War Against Poverty is Not Optional for Lawyers’, (2015) accessible via the IBA 
website for the Poverty, Empowerment, and Rule of Law Working Group, available at this link: 
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=f9ce20d3-15f9-417e-a9d8-59198ea304b2.  
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in any jurisdiction where (and to the extent that) poverty is tolerated. In that sense, 
lawyerly fidelity to the rule of law is integrally implicated and itself limited by any 
acceptance of poverty as an unpreventable reality in the localities where lawyers 
conduct business and wield influence. The priority given to eradicating poverty and 
otherwise achieving social justice in various cross-sectoral goals within the global 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) further reinforces exploration of the 
connection between poverty, access to justice, and the rule of law. Once the reality of 
global climate change and its impact upon accomplishment of many or all SDGs are 
brought into focus, there is no better time to integrate law schools’ traditional and CLE 
programs to greater effect in securing access to justice locally and globally. 
In that sense, the responsibility of lawyers towards the legal conditions of poor people 
and flowing from true fidelity to the rule of law therefore encompasses lawyerly 
responsibility towards access to justice as part of the rule of law. Is that really such an 
outrageous claim, in an era of modern slavery reporting requirements, ‘social licence 
to operate’ requirements in corporate governance standards, ‘social’ dimensions of 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations in investment decision-
making, UN and IBA guidelines for lawyers on business and human rights, and 
sustainable development goals (SDGs) that prioritise both eradication of poverty and 
access to justice? 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the analysis above, all CLE programs are nested in a series of co-extensive 
and socially significant identities and functions. They are located in law schools, 
which operate in broader university and professional environments, or in CLCs, 
which (along with law schools) also have roles as part of an access to justice 
constituency, as actors within contemporary democracy under the rule of law, and as 
participants in a global legal profession owing fidelity to full realisation of the rule of 
law. Their success in the future turns, at least in part, on how well they respond and 
adapt to disruption through technology, globalisation, and democratisation. 
Successfully pitching, designing, resourcing, and implementing something like 
Monash Law’s Clinical Guarantee can only be done with due sensitivity towards all 
of those dynamics. 
In that important sense, the macro-level considerations canvassed in the second part 
of this article, about how enhanced clinical programs relate to their external 
environments, dovetail with the micro-level considerations canvassed in the first part 
of this article, about how designing and delivering enhanced clinical programs 
navigates internal institutional environments for law schools and their clinicians. 
Making CLE pat of the DNA of a law school increasingly requires nothing less.  
 
